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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. INTENDED PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to determine the viability of cost savings resulting 
from the Department of Defense (DoD) internally financing Energy Savings Performance 
Contracts (ESPC).  Currently all federal agencies use external, private financing to pay 
the up-front costs of the program.  This study will determine what benefit, if any, the 
DoD will realize by creating an internal financing mechanism. 
The issue of energy efficiency is becoming more important each year.  According 
to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), “The federal government is the single largest 
energy consumer in the nation, spending about $3.7 billion in fiscal year 2002 on energy 
for its approximately 500,000 facilities in the United States.”1  The government’s large, 
aging facility footprint coupled with rising energy costs are combining in an undesirable 
synergy, resulting in escalating, non-discretionary energy bills. 
The executive branch has taken proactive measures to improve the overall energy 
efficiency of the federal government.  Most notable is Executive Order 13123.  Signed in 
1999, the order mandates that all federal agencies reduce total energy consumption by 
35%, based on a 1985 baseline, by the year 2010.2  At long last, energy management has 
a metric and a deadline.  A more subtle section of EO 13123 gives encouragement to use 
all authorized financing programs.  Therefore, agencies not only have a goal with a 
deadline, but also a suggested path to accomplish the requirements. 
 
B. BACKGROUND 
Energy Savings Performance Contracts fulfill an important role in the 
infrastructure maintenance at DoD facilities.  The premise of the program is to give 
 
1 Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate for H.R. 1533, May 2005, available from 
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=6396&sequence=0, accessed 1 Oct 2005 
2 Executive Order 13123, Greening The Government Through Energy Efficient Management, Federal 
Register Vol. 64, No. 109, 8 June 1999 
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engineers the flexibility to improve overall facility energy efficiency by financing 
infrastructure improvement projects, thereby avoiding the normal appropriation channels.   
 
1. The History of the ESPC Program  
Congress gave federal agencies the authority to enter into ESPCs in 1992.  The 
contract authorization was officially codified in National Energy Conservation Policy Act 
(42 USC 8287).3  The law allows agencies to finance energy savings projects for up to a 
period of 25 years.  Congress stipulated that “Aggregate annual payments by an agency… 
under an energy savings performance contract, may not exceed the amount that the 
agency would have paid for utilities without an energy savings performance contract (as 
estimated through the procedures developed pursuant to this section) during contract 
years.” 4  Therefore, ESPCs allow agencies to invest in energy saving infrastructure 
improvements so long as those improvements pay for themselves within a 25-year 
financing period.  
42 USC 8287 established in the minds of federal agencies, that ESPCs are a zero 
cost program for the government, creating a new source of money available for 
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) investment.  The size of each investment is only 
limited by the total value of the saved energy, thus no net annual loss for the government.  
The no cost label enabled installations to use ESPCs to obtain the required equipment 
upgrades needed to move closer to the energy reductions mandated in EO 13123.  The 
Department of Defense has led all federal agencies, awarding approximately 153 ESPCs, 
an investment worth about $1.8 billion, impacting nearly 100 military installations.5  The 
popularity of these contracts within DoD has led to a substantial long-term commitment, 
under the auspice of “no cost” to the government. 
 
 
3 42 United States Code 8287, Energy Savings Performance Contracts, [database online] available 
from http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode42/usc_sec_42_ 00008287----000-.html, accessed on 
1 October 2005  
4 Ibid 
5 Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate for H.R. 1533, May 2005, available from 
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=6396&sequence=0, accessed 1 Oct 2005 
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2. What ESPCs Do for the DoD 
Energy Savings Performance Contracts play an important role in maintaining 
DoD’s critical energy infrastructure.  Energy intensive equipment supports vital mission 
essential activities.  ESPCs directly address this genre of equipment.  In particular, more 
efficient equipment is generally more reliable.  Increased reliability results in an 
enhanced ability to deliver the required mission support.  Overall, with an ESPC, the 
equipment delivers the support with more certainty than equipment not managed to 
maximum efficiency. 
Energy efficiency improvements support the DoD mission in several ways.  For 
example, lighting accounts for approximately 40-50% of total electrical use inside 
commercial spaces.6  Furthermore, without proper lighting, indoor tasks become more 
difficult.  One solution is mission oriented, adding more lighting to the workspace, 
regardless of energy use. On the opposite end of the spectrum is saving energy at the cost 
of mission capability, sacrificing necessary lighting by mandating, across-the-board, cuts 
in overall lighting levels.  An ESPC seeks to determine the required quantity and type of 
light for the task and then deliver it with the most effective, and efficient, system.  The 
result is the creation of a program where the opposing forces of mission accomplishment 
and energy efficiency are in balance.  Lighting is not the only example of the juxtaposed 
positions of efficiency and capability.   
Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) equipment is an example of 
mechanical equipment infrastructure where ESPCs do the most to cost effectively meet 
mission support requirements.  The DoD maintains bases in many extreme climates.  
Heating is critical to base operations in places like Fairbanks, Alaska.  On the other 
extreme, air conditioning allows missions to succeed in hot, humid climates such as 
Guam.  Air conditioning uses an extremely large sum of electricity to run a complex 
series of compressors, fans, and pumps.  Both systems are extremely expensive.  Finally, 
this equipment can last much longer than the predicted life cycle.  Planning for the costly, 
unpredictable and inevitable replacement is very difficult.  ESPCs allow the DoD to 
 
6 Energy Information Administration, Lighting in Commercial Buildings-1986, [online database], 
available from http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cbecs/cbecs2f.html, accessed on 18 Oct 2005 
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replace old, inefficient HVAC units, extend the useful life of properly working units, and 
reduce the frequency of failures, all while consuming less energy.  Once again, a properly 
implemented ESPC finds the balance between efficiency and mission support through 
comprehensive planning.   
 
3. ESPC Benefits for the DoD 
The ESPC program provides a significant benefit to the DoD by breaking the 
bond between appropriated dollars and infrastructure investment.  Under normal 
circumstances, a base or installation has to dedicate a significant percentage of its annual 
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) budget to upgrading its environmental controls and 
lighting.  Unfortunately, in budget-constrained circumstances, bases are often only able to 
fully fund the most critical O&M projects, deferring the repair and replacement of old but 
operational equipment to future years.  As this cycle is repeated each year, only the 
equipment that is beyond repair is actually replaced.  Thus, after sequential years of under 
investment, the DoD is left with an infrastructure reliant upon equipment that has 
exceeded its useful life span.  ESPCs allow bases to seek funding, outside of the 
appropriations process, thus breaking the cycle of under funded appropriations. 
The aging infrastructure phenomenon is seen through mostly anecdotal evidence.  
The Government Accountability Office (GAO), congress, and the media all reference the 
difficulty, real or apparent, installations have in obtaining appropriated funds for 
infrastructure upgrades.  The difficulty of managing an energy program, representative of 
most DoD installations, is found in an article written by the Energy Manager at Kirtland 
Air Force Base, NM.  The manager bemoans the agonizing appropriations process.  
Appropriations rarely provide enough funds for a comprehensive plan that can be 
implemented over a short period of time to capture all the available benefits.  While 
cautionary on the ESPC program costs, the manager does cite the ability to work outside 
the appropriations process as the single biggest benefit to the installation.7  Therefore, if 
 
 
7 Weber and Huckeby, Defense AR Journal. Fort Belvoir: Feb/Mar 2005. Vol. 12, Iss. 1;  p. 78 
installations can find a substantial value in managing the infrastructure equipment via the 
ESPC, then both the DoD and its installations are the recipients of the aggregate benefits 
from infrastructure improvement. 
The ESPC can also benefit the DoD financially.  As stated earlier, installations 
can undertake an investment equal to the present value of the forgone energy 
consumption.  The Federal Energy Management Program depicts the before, during and 
after effects of an ESPC on an agency’s energy budget. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Annual Expenses Before, During, and After ESPC  
From Federal Energy Management Program, accessed from www.eere.femp.gov, 
1 Oct 2005 
In this example, the agency is first paying for the status quo Energy plus 
Operations and Maintenance.  The contract provides an investment that results in a total 
annual cost savings.  After the investment obligation is paid off, the agency realizes the 
annual avoided costs, theoretically making money available for core mission activities. 
From a more abstract perspective, the ESPC benefits the DoD by allowing the 
department to unlock the value currently residing in unnecessary annual energy expenses.   
There is an added benefit of reinvesting the unlocked value back into the system.  
Currently, without an energy contract, investments made through appropriations are 
extremely difficult to tie to a specific savings result.  The ESPC promotes both energy 
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savings and energy infrastructure investment at the same time and at a level that is 
inherently balanced.   
 
4. How Much Does the ESPC Program Cost the DoD 
There is no clear consensus on the true cost of an ESPC.  Proponents say that the 
financial payments are made out of actual, avoided energy bills, therefore there is no 
annual cost to the government.  Critics of the program, particularly the GAO, point to the, 
lack of competition, program complexity, and imbedded interest rates charged by the 
financial institutions as a sign of the additional cost of private financing when compared 
to the government’s cost to finance via treasury bills.8  This is a typical, politically 
charged comparison because both sides are correct. 
The proponents of the ESPC correctly defend that ESPCs do not cost the 
government.  In an annual budgetary sense, this is true.  Before the contract, the agency 
must foot the energy bill regardless of cost.  After the contract, the installation pays the 
reduced energy bill while also paying the bank to service the debt on the financed 
equipment.  The net budgetary result for the installation is zero or slightly positive.  The 
result is new equipment for the government without any change to the total annual 
outlays.   
Critics point out that the only dependent variable when defining the terms of an 
ESPC contract is time.  The principle borrowed is based on how much the equipment 
costs.  The amount of annual savings is determined by the sum total of the measures 
implemented.  The finance institution sets the interest rate.  Therefore, the base can only 
manipulate the amount of principle borrowed and the value of annual energy savings.  As 
the borrower, the base has little control over the interest rate.  All three variables result in 
the length of the contract term.  The GAO argues that the rates set by the financial 
institutions are greater than what the government could borrow via Treasury Bills 
therefore resulting in longer ESPC contract terms.  The result of the higher rate and 
 
8 General Accountability Office, Energy Savings: Performance Contracts Offer Benefits, but Vigilance 
Is Needed to Protect Government Interests, p. 35, [database online], GAO-05-340, June 2005, available 
from www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-340, accessed on 1 Oct 05   
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longer term is a higher present value of the payments made by the government than if the 
work was financed with Treasury Bills.9
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research revolves around the financing aspect of the ESPC program.  The 
primary research questions will determine the feasibility of an alternative financing 
program. 
 
1. Primary Research Question  
Does internal financing of the ESPC program create energy wealth for the DoD? 
Wealth, in this case, is not of the traditional definition.  The DoD does not 
accumulate money.  For the purposes of this project, wealth is the quantity of money 
unlocked from current energy bill obligations and reinvested into the energy 
infrastructure of a DoD installation.   
 
2. Secondary Questions 
In order to answer the primary research question, secondary questions must be 
considered.  
What is the financial magnitude of using internally financed projects instead of 
the current private lending institutions?  
The amount of money available to be unlocked is crucial to the feasibility of the 
proposed financing mechanism. 
Is there an mechanism, internal to DoD, available to facilitate investment cash 
flow for ESPC projects? 
 
9 General Accountability Office, Capital Financing: Partnerships and Energy Savings Performance 
Contracts Raise Budgeting and Monitoring Concerns, p. 26,GAO-05-55, December 2004, [database online] 
available from www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-55, accessed on 1 October 05 
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The implementation of an internal mechanism must add value to the DoD energy 
infrastructure.  The net effect of the investment and subsequent cash flow must follow a 
logical path that builds wealth.  
 
D. THESIS SCOPE 
This thesis will only look at the financing aspect of the ESPC program.  The 
option of paying for energy improvements with full, up-front appropriations will not be 
considered as an alternative.  Furthermore, the current contracting process and 
engineering principles will not be considered for improvement.  The ESPC program has 
many facets that could possibly be improved upon.  For example, there is no widely 
accepted principle of measuring and verifying the effectiveness of Energy Control 
Measurers (ECM).  Some agencies require an annual audit of the ECMs, while others 
regard the calculations as an unnecessary expense without any scientific merit.  Another 
criticism of the program is its reactive nature.  Critics point to the hundreds of thousand 
of square feet added to the DoD inventory each year as an area where ESPC principles 
could reduce the need for almost immediate energy retrofit.  No easy method is available 
to incorporate Energy Savings into the design process.  Therefore, installations do not 
have an incentive to submit energy efficient Military Construction designs.  Despite these 
difficulties, the financing of the ESPC program is most closely related to the Financial 
Management curriculum, the centerpiece of this paper.  Aspects of the program that have 
an impact on financial management will be considered but will be considered only for 
financial management implications not for engineering or contracting effects. 
 
E. BENEFITS OF THIS STUDY 
The government practice of financing energy projects has recently been living on 
borrowed time and is in need of a revolutionary change to permanently win needed 
Congressional support.  As stated earlier, the ESPC program was actually allowed to 
expire at the end of FY2003 before being renewed for a single year.  The lack of 
commitment from Congress is understandable due to the real costs of the program. The 
CBO estimates that the equivalent annual direct spending cost of the ESPC program 
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(construction plus financing costs greater than treasury rates) will be $300M in FY2007 
and the annual sum will grow about 5% each subsequent year.10  Therefore, it is evident 
that the ESPC program is not a free lunch for the federal government.   
The DoD should not have to rely only upon the private sector for the flexibility 
offered through energy project financing.  A change to the financing aspect of the ESPC 
program should unlock enough value in the current energy obligations to pay for any 
initial investment and for future projects long into the future.  Therefore, this study will 
help determine if there is a benefit to utilizing internal financing or if the current private 
financing mechanism is more effective.    
 
F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES 
The first phase of research determined what terms are currently being used to 
finance energy projects.  The General Accounting Office recently completed a 
comprehensive study into the relative characteristics of ESPCs.  Important factors such as 
principle financed, years, interest rates, and annual payments were used to determine the 
typical project size and scope.  These data were used to determine the typical ESPC 
contract. 
The typical contract was then used as the basis for creating a financing profile for 
the internal financing option.  The internal option has to be a fair comparison.  Therefore, 
by using the typical contract, the comparisons will be able to quantify the potential for 
wealth to be built using the internal mechanism. 
 
G. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized to compare and contrast the current and proposed ESPC 
financing mechanisms.  Chapter I introduces the ESPC program.  In this section, the 
history of the program, its benefits, and the program’s costs are discussed.   
 
10 Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate for H.R. 1533, May 2005, available from 
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=6396&sequence=0, accessed 1 October 2005 
 10
In Chapter II, a literature review is conducted.  This chapter looks at the published 
documents surrounding the ESPC program.  It focuses on the reports and articles that are 
directly related to the financing portion of the program.  In addition, the review outlines, 
in basic terms, how wealth is created in financial institutions.   
Chapter III outlines the existing ESPC financing program.  The qualitative 
advantages and disadvantages of private financing are discussed.  The quantitative costs 
of using private financing are also be outlined.  In this section, a historically based, 
average project is be determined and used in subsequent sections to compare and contrast 
the advantages of alternatives.  
Chapter IV focuses on the proposed alternative of DoD internally financing ESPC 
projects.  The average project, as defined in Chapter III, is used to assess how much long-
term wealth can be built using internal financing.  Various combinations of interest rates 
and terms are used to measure the sensitivity of the program.  
Chapter V takes the findings from Chapter III and IV and recommends one 
alternative over another.  The recommendation is based only upon the data as assumed 
and derived from the limited sources of available information.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. PRINCIPLES OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
The field of energy efficiency is studied from many different angles.  The 
financial ramifications for public and private entities are staggering.  The American 
Council For An Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE) published its Online Guide To 
Energy Efficient Commercial Equipment.  In the guide, ACEEE estimates that within the 
United States, building owners spend, on average, $1.21/ft2 for energy services.11  Energy 
services, in this case, include heating, cooling, and lighting. 
 
B. FEDERAL ENERGY MANAGEMENT 
1. Executive Branch Energy Management 
The Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) is the agency tasked with 
defining the goals for the federal government’s energy program.  The FEMP website is 
the primary source for DoD facilities seeking energy management guidance.  The office 
puts the onus on facility managers to, “Make choices that are cost-effective, energy-
smart, environmentally sound, and reliable.”12  Therefore, the federal government defines 
energy efficiency as balancing cost savings without adversely affecting the environment 
or the mission.  FEMP states the government’s vision based on this definition, “By 
promoting energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy resources at federal sites, 
the Federal Energy Management Program helps agencies save energy, taxpayer dollars, 
and demonstrate leadership with responsible, cleaner energy choices.”13
The mandate behind the federal government’s energy programs is Executive 
Order 13123, Greening The Government Through Efficient Energy Management.  The 
document set numerous goals for the federal government.  It set the far-reaching goal to 
 
11 American Council For An Energy Efficient Economy, Online Guide to Energy-Efficient 
Commercial Equipment, [online magazine], available from http://www.aceee.org/ogeece/ch1_index.htm, 
accessed 1 Oct 2005 
12 Federal Energy Management Program, [online magazine] 
http://www.eere.energy.gov/femp/technologies/technologies.cfm, accessed 15 Sep 2005 
13 Federal Energy Management Program, http://www.eere.energy.gov/femp/, accessed 15 Sep 2005 
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reduce the amount of energy consumed across all federal agencies.  Section 202 states, 
“Through life-cycle cost-effective measures, each agency shall reduce energy 
consumption per gross square foot of its facilities, excluding facilities covered in section 
203 of this order, by 30 percent by 2005 and 35 percent by 2010 relative to 1985.”14  
EO13123 also aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, enhance water conservation, 
reduce total petroleum consumption, and to initiate the procurement of renewable energy 
sources.15  The order also gives guidelines on how to achieve the mandates. 
EO13123 singles out two preferred sources of capital for agencies to invest into 
energy reduction.  First, the agencies are directed to submit, within the annual budget, 
requests for money to be directed to achieving the energy reduction mandates.  It also 
stipulates that agencies are to utilize all available alternative financing options, 
specifically Energy Savings Performance Contracts.16
 
2. Executive Branch ESPC Financing Efforts 
Recently, FEMP established a working group to look specifically at ESPC 
financing.  The working group published the report, Reducing Financing Costs for 
Federal ESPCs, on December 7, 2004.  The report looks at the critiques of the ESPC 
program, assesses the weaknesses, and recommends corrective measures that will 
enhance the program.  The working group recommends a set of reforms. 
These reforms directly address concerns related to cost-effectiveness of 
ESPCs that were raised by several government audits and assessments of 
federal ESPCs awarded under DOE’s and other agencies’ programs. 
Incorporating these practices will mitigate many of the problems pointed 
out in those documents, but will also improve and strengthen federal 
ESPC programs to the benefit of all participants. With lower financing 
costs, ESPCs can have shorter terms, or agencies can gain more 
improvements for the same money. Larger projects will add to the sales of 
private-sector ESCOs. The new requirements will also allow greater 
participation by more private-sector financiers. All participants will 
 
14 Executive Order 13123, Greening The Government Through Energy Efficient Management, Federal 




                                                
benefit from improvements that bolster confidence in the value of federal 
ESPCs and strengthen the case for permanent extension of the federal 
ESPC authority.17
The working group identifies the hidden value currently tied up in the financing 
aspect of ESPC projects.  They were able to determine that the result of more 
advantageous financing terms will result in a wider scope of projects for the same amount 
of investment.  
The Finance Cost Reduction Working Group focused its attention on the lack of 
competition amongst prospective financiers.  The most significant reform proposed by 
the working group is to introduce an element of competition between financiers.  The 
working group recommends that the ESCO solicit at least three different financing 
offers.18  The working group expects the competitive aspect to result in better terms for 
the government. 
 
3. GAO ESPC Reports 
The GAO is the government agency charged with maintaining accountability for 
the federal government and its agencies.  It published a report, Performance Contracts 
Offer Benefits, But Vigilance Is Needed To Protect Government Interests, on June 22, 
2005.  Additionally, the GAO also looked at the ESPC program in December 2004 with a 
report titled, Partnership and Energy Savings Performance Contracts Raise 
BudgetingAnd Monitoring Concerns.  Together, these two reports raise the harshest 
criticism of the way the ESPC program is represented in the budget and how contracts are 
executed on behalf of the government. 
The June 2005 report is the most comprehensive publication on how the ESPC 
program has been used by the various government agencies.  The GAO reports: 
 
 
17  Finance Cost Reduction Working Group, Reducing Financing Costs for Federal ESPCs, [online 
database] , p. vi, available from www.ornl.gov/sci/femp/pdfs/fcrwg_rpt_espcsc_041207.pdf accessed 
December 7, 2004 
18 Ibid, p. 3 
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(1) The extent to which federal agencies use ESPCs. 
 
During fiscal years 1999 through 2003, numerous agencies undertook 
ESPCs to finance energy-efficiency improvements, committing the federal 
government to annual payments totaling about $2.5 billion over the terms of 
these contracts. The use of ESPCs has been geographically widespread, with 
many types of equipment installed, and the extent of use has varied across 
the agencies.19
 
(2) What energy savings, financial savings, and other benefits agencies expect to 
achieve.   
 
Agencies expect to achieve benefits that include energy savings worth 
at least $2.5 billion over the life of the contracts, as well as other benefits 
that cannot be easily quantified, such as improved reliability of the newer 
equipment over the aging equipment it replaced, environmental 
improvements, and additional energy and financial savings once the 
contracts have been paid for.”20
 
(3) The extent to which actual financial savings from ESPCs cover costs;. 
 
Agencies structure ESPCs so that financial savings cover costs and 
they reported that many do.  However, GAO could not verify that 
conclusion using the data on ESPCs, and GAO work and agency audits 
disclosed ESPCs in which unfavorable contract terms, missing 
documentation, and other problems caused GAO to question how 
consistently savings cover costs.  Furthermore, differing interpretations of 
the law establishing ESPCs about what components of costs must be paid 
for from the savings generated by the project or may be paid for using 
other funding sources have contributed to uncertainties about whether 
savings are appropriately covering costs.21
(4) What areas, if any, require steps to protect the government’s financial 
interests in using ESPCs.22
 
According to agency officials, they often lacked the technical and contracting 
expertise and information (such as interest rates and markups) to negotiate ESPCs 
and to monitor contract performance in the long term.  The officials also think 
 
19 General Accountability Office, Energy Savings: Performance Contracts Offer Benefits, but 
Vigilance Is Needed to Protect Government Interests, p. 35, [database online], GAO-05-340, June 2005, 
available from www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-340, accessed on 1 October 2005 
20 Ibid, p. 1 
21 Ibid 
22 Ibid, p. 53 
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there may be insufficient competition among finance and energy services 
companies and that this could lead to higher costs for ESPCs.” 23  
 
Using these objectives, the GAO formulated a very broad recommendation for 
improving the program.  The GAO states that Congress should clarify what contract costs 
must be covered by the energy savings.  The GAO also recommends that agencies 
implement elements of competition to ensure savings cover the costs.  Finally, the GAO 
wants the DOE to take a more active role in facilitating the ESPC program for the entire 
federal government.24  The report provides numerous case studies to support the 
recommendations. 
The 2004 report is the first government sponsored research into the true cost of 
the ESPC program.  The report looks at the impact the ESPC program commitments have 
on the annual budget process and how to properly capture the cost of the contracts.  The 
objectives of this report are outlined in three parts. 
  
 1. What specific attributes of energy savings performance contracts  
 (ESPC) and public/private partnerships (partnerships) contribute to budget  
 scoring decisions.   
  
 2. The costs of financing through ESPCs and partnerships compared to the  
 costs of financing via timely, full, and up-front appropriations.  
  
 3. How ESPCs and partnerships are implemented and monitored.25
The GAO wants to make sure that Congress is able to compare the ESPC 
program’s true cost against up-front appropriations in order to make necessary budget 





23 General Accountability Office, Energy Savings: Performance Contracts Offer Benefits, but 
Vigilance Is Needed to Protect Government Interests, p. 1, [database online], GAO-05-340, June 2005, 
available from www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-340, accessed on 1 October 2005 
24 Ibid, p. 54 
25 General Accountability Office, Capital Financing: Partnerships and Energy Savings Performance 
Contracts Raise Budgeting and Monitoring Concerns, p. 50,GAO-05-55, December 2004, [database online] 
available from www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-55, accessed on 1 October 2005 
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C. PUBLIC POLICY VIEWS OF THE ESPC PROGRAM 
Public policy organizations also play a role in the open discussion defining the 
ESPC program.  These alliances organize the views of energy efficiency experts, local 
and state governments, ESCOs, and private citizens.  They all share an interest in 
improving energy efficiency. 
 
1. The Alliance to Save Energy 
The Alliance to Save Energy (ASE) is an organization formed to support all forms 
of energy efficiency.  Specifically, the group has published its position that the ESPC 
program is a strong partnership between the government, contractors, and the financial 
industry.  According to ASE, “Approximately $1 billion in taxpayer dollars is still wasted 
each year in buildings alone.”26  Therefore, according to the ASE, the government has a 
long path ahead toward energy responsibility.  The ASE takes this position to Congress in 
an effort to influence public policy. 
The ASE wants the federal government to resolve the ambiguity surrounding the 
true costs of the ESPC program.  In a letter to the House Budget Committee (March 
2005) ASE, and other interested parties, asked Congress to determine the proper ESPC 
costs, “The budget score assigned by CBO conveys the false impression that ESPCs 
require billions of dollars of new federal spending.  The CBO methodology does not 
account for contractual obligations on the private sector to ensure that an ESPC project 
reduces government costs.”27  To further cloud the issue, ASE cites OMB’s position that 
the ESPC program is budget neutral and that it saves the government money in the long 
run.28  Therefore, there is no clear stance by the federal government on the true cost of 
the ESPC program.   
 
26 Alliance to Save Energy, Fact Sheet, [online magazine] available from 




                                                
The ASE and its partners avoid the assertion that the ESPC is a no cost program.  
The group only asserts that the government benefits from saved energy and money.29  
There is no quantitative analysis of the amount of money saved for every dollar invested.  
The emphasis of the argument is the post contract scenario, “The government keeps all 
the savings after the investment is paid off, allowing taxpayer dollars to be used for other 
necessities.”30  This argument is not supported with any quantitative analysis regarding 
the present value of the future savings, only the assertion that the savings exist. 
 
2. The Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory ESCO 
Service Study 
The Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory conducted a study, Public and 
Institutional Markets for ESCO Services: Comparing Programs, Practices and 
Performance, into the costs and benefits of the government’s partnership with the private 
ESCOs.  The study emphasizes the actual contractual performance of the ESCOs and the 
promised performance goals.  The scope of the study includes the federal government as 
well as municipalities, universities, schools, and hospitals (MUSH).31  They looked at 
1,634 projects, of which 129 were federally sponsored ESPC projects.  Together, these 
data provide a unique insight into the commercially financed energy performance 
contract marketplace. 
The key findings in this paper tell the story of the energy savings marketplace.  
The study found that the 1,634 projects accounted for up to $19B in energy infrastructure 
investment.32  Once again, the lack of central control over these contracts prevents a 
definitive accounting of all contracts.  The study determined that the federal ESPC 
program is, “Cost-effective and represents a value, not a cost, to the federal 
 
29 Alliance to Save Energy, Fact Sheet, [online magazine] available from 
http://www.ase.org/uploaded_files /policy/FEMP%20Fact% 20Sheet.pdf, accessed 15 Oct 05 
30 Ibid 
31 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Public and Institutional Markets for ESCO Services: 
Comparing Programs, Practices and Performance, [online database], p. ix, available from 
http://eetd.lbl.gov/EA/EMP/reports/55002.pdf, accessed 1 Oct 05 
32 Ibid, p. xvii 
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government.”33  The findings are both quantitative and qualitative but the final 
determination of value takes an unorthodox view of determining value.   
From the perspective of the Laboratory, the hidden cost of investing in energy 
infrastructure is not financing the construction costs but rather it is the opportunity cost in 
delays in the appropriations process.  In the words of the authors, “Project delay 
significantly erodes net benefits. In a congressional budget environment with limited 
availability of capital to fund energy-efficiency projects, financed Super ESPC projects 
represent an attractive investment approach, in part because contractual guarantees ensure 
that benefits will persist over the project’s economic lifetime.”34  The Laboratory has 
found that more money is wasted in the form of higher energy bills during the long 
appropriations process than is spent financing the expedient ESPC process.   
The Laboratory repackages the opinions of the GAO regarding the reluctance of 
energy managers to seek appropriations. 
Our results suggest that timely appropriated projects may provide 
equal or greater net benefits than financed ESPCs. However, in reality 
most projects do not receive timely appropriations and appropriated 
projects, when funded, often take longer to develop and implement. Even 
at the most forgiving discount rate (5%), delays of more than one year in 
obtaining congressional appropriations result in reduced net benefits 
relative to ESPC-financed projects. The longer an agency waits, the more 
drastic this effect.  35
 
The delays of the appropriation process decay the benefits of implementing the energy 
projects.  The study summarizes the reality of appropriations and alternative financing.  
“Financing energy-efficiency investments can allow customers to capture years of energy 




33 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Public and Institutional Markets for ESCO Services: 
Comparing Programs, Practices and Performance, [online database], p. xviii, available from 
http://eetd.lbl.gov/EA/EMP/reports/55002.pdf, accessed 1 Oct 05 
34 Ibid 
35 Ibid 
36 Ibid, p. 56 
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D. LENDING AND FINANCING 
1. Ritter and Silber 
In Principles of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets Lawrence S. Ritter and 
William L. Silber lay the foundation of the banking system.  They summarize the 
principles behind lending and borrowing. 
 
Financial institutions have sprung up-such as commercial banks, 
savings banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, insurance 
companies, mutual funds, and pension funds-that act as intermediaries in 
transferring funds from ultimate lenders to ultimate borrowers.  Such 
financial intermediaries themselves borrow from savers-lenders and then 
turn around and lend the funds to borrowers-investors.  They mobilize the 
savings of many small savers and package them for sale to the highest 
bidders.  In the process, again both ultimate saver-lenders and ultimate 
borrowers-investors gain.37
 
Under the proper circumstances, all parties benefit from these transactions.  
According to Ritter and Silber, the saver benefits from the interest paid by the bank, 
assuming the alternative for the saver is holding cash.  The borrower gains by investing in 
a project that has a higher rate of return than the interest charged by the bank.  Finally, 
the bank gains by charging the borrower a higher rate than it is giving to the saver.38  
This process results in the bank creating money.  It increases the amount of money in 
deposits by lending money to borrowers who pay interest back to the bank. 
The banking industry does have limitations.  The authors state, “A commercial 
bank can lend up to the amount of its excess reserves, and no more.”39  This leads to the 
authors’ argument that there is a constant tug of war between the relative safety of 
liquidity (money in reserves) and the need to make a profit by lending money to 
borrowers.40  Banks are torn between paying out interest to attract savers while at the  
 
 
37 Ritter and Silber, Principles of Money Banking and Financial Markets, Basic Books Inc, NY, 1986, 
p. 11  
38 Ibid p. 10 
39 Ibid, p. 37 
40 Ibid,p. 127 
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same time finding quality borrowers that will generate the return needed to be profitable.  
Therefore, the profitability risk is mitigated by the spread between these two interest 
rates. 
 
2. Prather’s View in Money and Banking 
In Money and Banking, Charles Prather examines the nature of the banking 
industry.  Topics in this book include management of bank funds, risk, and commercial 
bank earnings. 
According to Prather, banks walk a fine line between profitability and insolvency.  
He states, “Over a period of years a sound bank must earn enough interest to pay all its 
expenses, to cover losses, and to provide a reasonable return on its capital accounts.”41  If 
this one principle is violated, the bank looses its capital accounts.  Therefore, states Dr. 
Prather, the bank no longer has enough assets to meet the demand of deposit accounts. 
The function of bank management is to address the risks of banking sufficiently to 
ensure that the bank remains profitable.  Dr. Prather identifies many banking risks: 
attracting new customers (borrowers and savers), optimizing liquidity, risk of a bank run, 
risk from insolvency, and risk from the uncontrollable (war).  Above all, Prather states 
that, “While a bank’s liquidity is important, the danger of nonliquidity is minor compared 
to the danger of insolvency.”42  Insolvency occurs when the bank does not have enough 
assets to meet its obligations.  According to Prather it is as simple as, “a few bad loans, 
one unsound investment, or one dishonest employee.”43  Therefore, in banking, 
management must decide to loan funds to quality projects and use the interest rate it 
charges to ensure the long-term profitability of the institution.  
ESCOs have chosen the banking industry as the source of capital for the ESPC 
program.  For-Profit financial institutions are used to raise the capital needed for the 
infrastructure improvements.  This is the function under analysis in this project. 
 
41 Prather, Charles, Money and Banking, Business Publications Inc, Homewood Il, 1969, p. 264 
42 Ritter and Silber, Principles of Money Banking and Financial Markets, Basic Books Inc, NY, 1986, 
p. 244 
43 Ibid, p. 244 
E. DEFENSE WORKING CAPITAL FUNDS 
The DoD defines the principle of working capital funds (WCF) as, “The cyclical 
nature of the cash flow into and out of the fund—providers of goods and services finance 
their continuing operations with income derived from sales to customers.”44  The key to 
the WCF fund is the disassociation from direct appropriations, instead relying on sales to 
DoD customers to sustain operations.  The DoD states, “Business Areas use income 
derived from these sales to buy or replace inventory and to finance the continuing 
production of future goods and services without fiscal year limitations.”45  Figure 2 is the 
graphical representation of the WCF system. 
 
 
Figure 2.   DoD’s WCF Operational Cycle 
 
OSD Comptroller, iCenter, http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/icenter/dwcf 
/revolvingfund.htm
                                                 
44 Department of Defense Comptroller, iCenter, Revolving Fund, [online database] available from 




                                                
The flow of appropriated funds through the WCF allows the DoD to meet real 
world commitments.  According to the iCenter, once customers send appropriated dollars 
to the WCF to pay for services or goods, the money no longer has to be spent before the 
end of the fiscal year.  The WCF, therefore, acts much like a bank that lends capital and 
takes deposits.  The advantage to this system is the ability of the WCF to vary its 
operations based on the needs of its customers and to meet its long-term goal. 
The goal of the WCF is not to be profitable, but rather to break even.  The iCenter 
states, “Unlike profit-oriented commercial businesses, DWCF Business Areas strive to 
break even over the long-term, and set prices accordingly.”46  Thus, the WCF is an entity 
that allows appropriated dollars to be spent without fiscal year restrictions, on needed 
goods and services, with a long-term break even business plan. 
 
46 Department of Defense Comptroller, iCenter, Revolving Fund, [online database] available from 
http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/icenter/dwcf/revolvingfund.htm, accessed 15 Sep 05 
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III. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT ESPC FINANCING SYSTEM 
A. THE CASH FLOWS 
The cash flows associated with the ESPC program leave indelible marks that can 
be traced back to the beginning of various projects.  For every project four critical tasks 
are accomplished. 
   
1. The government identifies the need for an energy conservation measure. 
 
2. The government and the supplier agree upon a price. 
 
3. The supplier accomplishes the service. 
 
4. The government repays the supplier for the services during agreed  
upon term and amount. 
At some point during this process cash exchanges hands.  The exchange point is 
different based upon the mechanism used.  Furthermore, the parties involved are not 
always the same.  Thus, an analysis of the current cash flow options will help 
demonstrate the critical nature of financing ESPC projects.   
 
1. Fully Funded Projects Via Appropriations 
All energy projects can be accomplished without financing through a bank.  Full, 
up-front appropriations are the first option to accomplishing the same results of an ESPC.  
The flow of cash begins with the purchasing of Treasury Bills, assuming that the 
government is currently borrowing money to meet budgetary requirements, or meeting 
requirements by collecting taxes from the general public.  From there, obligational 
authority is provided an installation to procure the equipment and installation of an ECM 
via a congressional approved appropriation.  The local installation then compensates the 
contractor with outlays whose cash may be traced back to Treasury Bill sales or the 
collection of income and other taxes, thus completing the transaction.   
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The traceable cash flows end, in the up-front appropriations process, at the project 
completion point.  The facility will require less energy due to the installation of the ECM 
but it will (or may) not be able to accurately quantify the amount.  Furthermore, the 
installation does not realize a benefit from the reduced energy bill because the forgone 
expenses never materialize as additional money available for further infrastructure 
investment at that particular location.   
 
2. External ESPC Financing 
The process of identifying, designing, and construction the ECMs is identical 
regardless of the funding stream.  The current method of funding ESPC requires that the 
financing of the project be determined early in the project.  In this case, the ESCO 
secures a construction loan from a lender specializing in this type of contract. At this 
point the process becomes much more complicated. 
The cash flows of ESPC have no discernable beginning.  The capital needed to 
begin the process resides in the reserves of the few financial institutions that offer ESPC 
loans.  The capital is generated by pooling interest from other funds loaned to consumers.  
The bank collects the interest, pools it together, and sends it to the installation to be 
invested in a project. 
At the time of contract award, the ESCO begins to implement the required ECMS.  
The cash needed for the work is obtained from the financial institution funding the entire 
project.  No appropriations are needed to implement this phase of the project.   
At project completion, the government becomes liable to pay the ESCO an annual 
payment near the level of energy saved from the installed ECMS.  The agency still 
realizes no net change in its outlays, now there are two separate bills to pay that, in 
theory, amount to a quantity less than the previous bill without the ECMS installed.  One 
payment goes to the utility company, the other, to the ESCO.  The ESCO, in turn, sends 
the money onto the financial institution to service the debt on the ESPC construction 
loan.    
The financial institution takes the cash flow returning from the ESPC contract, 
bundles it with other inflows from its other loans, and lends money again.  This is done 
each subsequent year, allowing the bank to loan capital for more projects while earning a 
profit.  
 
B. THE NOMINAL PROJECT 
Historical data were used to determine the average size, scope, and terms of 
ESPCs within the DoD.  The GAO gathered the following data. 
 
Table 1.   GAO Report 
 
The DoD, over the specified time period entered into 153 contracts with total 
costs amounting to $1.76B.  The total cost figure includes both the investment and 
finance charges over the lives of the contracts.  The GAO also reported that the average 
interest rate for all ESPC contracts was a hefty 8% and the repayment term averaged 16 
years.47  All of this data allows the extrapolation of the average finance charges for an 
ESPC contract. 
 
1. Determining Average Investment and Average Financing Charges 
The sum of all payments, on average, is $1.76B / 153 projects = $11.5M/ESPC.  
Each payment over the 16 year average payback period must be equal, therefore, each 
Service Number of ProjectsTotal Costs
Air Force 63 760,012,668$           
Army 47 324,374,960$           
Navy 40 653,376,18$           
Other 3 21,040,420$             
DoD Total 153 1,758,804,23$        
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47 General Accountability Office, Energy Savings: Performance Contracts Offer Benefits, but 
Vigilance Is Needed to Protect Government Interests, p. 15, [database online], GAO-05-340, June 2005, 
available from www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-340  
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contract has $11.5M / 16 years = $718K/year obligation.  The rules of ESPC contracts 
state that an obligated payment must be no more than the quantity of energy saved.  Thus, 
it is assumed that, at a minimum, the average project saved a value of energy equal to the 
debt payment of the average project. 
The average annual payment of $718K, the known average interest rate of 8%, 
and the average 16 year term now allow a calculation of the total principal invested by 
the financial institution and the amount of interest paid by the government over the life of 
the loan.  Using a present value calculation, the beginning value of the average ESPC 
project is $6.4M.  Subtract the investment from the total cost of $11.5M and the total 
amount of interest paid by the government over the life of the average loan is$11.5M - 
$6.4M = $5.1M.  Therefore, financing significantly adds to the total cost of energy 
reduction projects.  Granted the total interest is not in present value terms, but the 80% 
increase in total cost is staggering. 
 
2. Defining the Nominal Project 
The nominal project will be used later to compare alternative financing strategies.  
To reduce complexity, comparisons will be made based on the cost and benefit of 
investing not a total dollar figure, but rather in another nominal project.  In this case, an 
investment will equal one new average ESPC project, representing $6.4M.  Each year the 
government must repay $718K or the equivalent of .13 or 13% of an investment in the 
nominal project.  This continues each year until the loan in paid off in year 16.  
The nominal project does not change in size and scope for this analysis.  Over 
time, the forces of inflation will raise the cost of the nominal project as well as the annual 
value of the energy saved.  The two do not rise at the same rate.  Therefore, it is assumed 
that in the future a nominal project will be approximately the same cost, in 2005 dollars 





C. EXTERNAL FINANCING CASH FLOW MODEL 
Modeling the net annual cash flows, assuming that the government has the 
requirement to continually invest in energy reducing equipment using the ESPC program, 
demonstrates the long term ramifications of using this program.  
  
1. External Financing Cash Flow Model Structure 
In this model, it is assumed that the government requires a single investment each 
year into the nominal ESPC project.  The investment, represented by a 1 (a single 
nominal project), is a positive cash flow into the government coming from the financial 
institution.  Following the investment are 16 consecutive -.13 (a percentage of a nominal 
project) cash payments by the government back to the financial institution.  In the model 
a single investment is undertaken each year.  The model could be taken out into 
perpetuity, however, for this analysis, the last investment was made to coincide with the 
final payment of the first investment.  Therefore, there are 17 total projects purchased 
over the life of the model.  
The actually savings from the reduced energy bills are not taken into 
consideration in this model.  The utility savings are independent of the financing 
mechanism.  The savings are relevant to the analysis of the ESPC program’s true cost 
when compared to the status quo, outside the scope of this paper. 
 
2. ESPC External Financing Results 
The model demonstrates that, with constant annual investment, the net cash flows 
of the ESPC program decrease each year.  Eventually, during year nine cash flows are 
actually negative.  At this point, the one new investment is smaller than the obligations 
incurred from the previous projects.  The increase in negative net cash flows is constant 
until the investments stop.  Without new investment to offset required payments, the net 
cash flow for the ESPC program jumps to its most negative point and the declines back 
towards zero as debt service on contracts is completely paid off.  Table 2 summarizes the 
cash flows. 
 Table 2.   Annual ESPC Nominal Project Cash Flows  
 
 
The present value (PV) of the net cash flows over the life of the program 
demonstrates whether the benefits of the upfront investment outweigh the cost of the 
annual debt service.  In order to calculate the PV a discount rate must be established. 
The discount rate for this calculation was set at the average yield of the 10-year 
Treasury Bill.  Treasuries represent the opportunity cost of capital for the government, or 












0 1 1 6.35$      
1 2 0.887 5.63$      
2 3 0.774 4.91$      
3 4 0.661 4.20$      
4 5 0.548 3.48$      
5 6 0.435 2.76$      
6 7 0.322 2.04$      
7 8 0.209 1.33$      
8 9 0.096 0.61$      
9 10 -0.017 (0.11)$   
10 11 -0.13 (0.83)$     
11 12 -0.243 (1.54)$     
12 13 -0.356 (2.26)$     
13 14 -0.469 (2.98)$     
14 15 -0.582 (3.70)$     
15 16 -0.695 (4.41)$     
16 17 -0.808 (5.13)$     
17 17 -1.808 (11.48)$   
18 17 -1.695 (10.76)$   
19 17 -1.582 (10.05)$   
20 17 -1.469 (9.33)$     
21 17 -1.356 (8.61)$     
22 17 -1.243 (7.89)$     
23 17 -1.13 (7.18)$     
24 17 -1.017 (6.46)$     
25 17 -0.904 (5.74)$     
26 17 -0.791 (5.02)$     
27 17 -0.678 (4.31)$     
28 17 -0.565 (3.59)$     
29 17 -0.452 (2.87)$     
30 17 -0.339 (2.15)$     
31 17 -0.226 (1.44)$     
32 17 -0.113 (0.72)$     
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because its maturity is near the length of the average ESPC term.  During 2005 the 10-
year has fluctuated between 4.0% and 4.5%.48  In order to be conservative the high of 
4.5% was used for the PV calculation.   
At the recommended discount rate, the PV of the net cash flow from externally 
financing the ESPC program is -3.15 nominal projects or $-20.2M.  Therefore the costs 
outweigh the benefits by accepting an annual investment of $6.4M for a nominal project 
for 17 years.  The PV demonstrates how the concerns over the costs of ESPC are not 
baseless but actually must lead to exploration into viable alternatives. 
 
D. REALITIES OF EXTERNAL FINANCING 
The reality of externally financing the ESPC project is the inevitable bill that must 
be paid with future appropriations.  The federal government must increase the level of 
financing each year to have a positive net cash flow from aggregate projects.  Otherwise, 
the service on the debt becomes larger than the new investment resulting in a negative net 
cash flow for the entire energy program.  Table 2 demonstrates this phenomenon in year 
nine.  At this point in time, the annual cost of each project is greater than the new 
investment.  Thus, the negative net cash flow. 
The early years of the model reflect the temptation of exploiting this program to 
its fullest potential.  The initial investment inflows are extremely large compared to the 
required annual repayment.  It is not until after the net cash flows become negative when 
the true cost of the program becomes apparent.  However, it is unlikely that the full affect 







48 Yahoo Finance, 10 Year Treasury Yield, [online database], available from 
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IV. INTERNAL FINANCING ALTERNATIVE 
A. OVERVIEW 
The value of the energy savings being unlocked by ESPCs gives the DoD an 
enticing opportunity to reinvest into more energy projects.  The DoD has the resources to 
establish a fund that, over the long run, will not only improve critical infrastructure, but 
will also unlock the money currently required by the outdated energy intensive 
equipment. 
 
B. CASH FLOW ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED PROGRAM 
For the purposes of this study a hypothetical financing structure and path were 
established.  The proposal follows the same steps as the current ESPC financing method 
but with a DoD revolving fund acting as the financial institution.  The structure of the 
cash flow model is as follows: 
 
1.  The ESPC Fund, based on the Defense Working Capital Fund concept, 
receives a corpus from Congress earmarked for the sole purpose of financing 
ESPC projects. 
 
2.  DoD facilities follow current ESPC methods up to the point where financing 
terms are determined. 
 
3.  At the time of contract award, the ESPC Fund, replaces the private bank’s role 
by financing the project on behalf of the installation. 
 
4.  After construction, the installation, repays the ESPC Fund, just as it would a 
private bank, until the project is paid in full. 
 
5.  The ESPC Fund, takes the repayment annuity, and reinvests the proceeds into 
additional projects, starting the cycle over. 
 
In this model, the ESCO and the installation are completely insulated from the 
project financing, just as they are under the current program.  The ESPC fund simply 
replaces the financial institution, remaining removed from the engineering and 
construction phases of the projects.   
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C. ASSUMPTIONS 
The hypothetical program assumes a high level of consistency between the 
current program and the proposed program.   
 
1.  The ESPC fund operates with a long-term requirement to breakeven, thus the 
fund is not free of cost, but only charges for administrative cost recovery. 
 
2.  The interest rate set by the ESPC Fund will be less than or equal to the most 
competitive rates offered by private financing institutions. 
 
3.  The ESPC Fund assumes risk of performance failures.  Currently private banks 
have to hedge, with higher interest rates, against the DoD not paying ESCOs for 
unrealized savings.49  New contract mechanisms must be implemented to keep the 
incentive for ESCOs to be conservative in estimating ECM performance but 
should be immaterial to the financing. 
 
4.  The average scope of the contracts and average annual savings generated by 
each contract will remain constant with the ESPC Fund financing projects.  The 
only changes should be the interest rate charged by the Fund and the length of the 
repayment term needed to fully recoup the initial investment.   
  
5.  All interest rates are fixed during the life of the program. 
 
D. ESPC FUND MODEL 
A hypothetical investment model, from the perspective of the ESPC Fund was 
created to see how well the reinvestment strategy would work.  The basis for the model 
was the nominal project derived from the GAO data.  The model was used to calculate 
the net present value of the cash flows resulting from the use of the ESPC Fund.    
  
1. The ESPC Fund Nominal Project 
The ESPC Fund changes the parameters of the nominal project.  Previously, the 
nominal project terms were calculated using the average interest rate, determined by the 
lending institutions, and the average payback term, derived from the interest rate and 
 
49 Finance Cost Reduction Working Group, Reducing Financing Costs for Federal ESPCs, [online 
database] , page 5, available from www.ornl.gov/sci/femp/pdfs/fcrwg_rpt_espcsc_041207.pdf accessed 
December 7, 2004 
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maximum allowed payment based on energy savings.  The ESPC Fund only has to 
recover its costs, operating on a long-term, breakeven basis.  Therefore, the fund’s 
interest rate only has to recover operating costs and the cost of borrowing for the 
government. 
The cost of borrowing is the most significant cost driver for the ESPC Fund.  
Assuming the Fund gains its initial corpus from government debt, an appropriate rate 
would be the same as the 10-Year Treasury Bill, approximately 4.5%.  The operating cost 
recovery factor will be orders of magnitude smaller than the financing charge.  Due to the 
relatively small operating cost, compared to the total cost of the projects, this recovery 
factor was not considered during this analysis.  
The nominal project for the ESPC Fund represents the same initial investment, 
$6.4M, as the externally funded project.  The value of energy saved is also the same, 
$718K, or .13 of a nominal project for both financing methods.  The interest rate for the 
ESPC Fund project is initially set at 4.5% resulting in a loan term of only 12 years, four 
years shorter than the externally funded program. 
  
2. ESPC Fund Model Results 
The ESPC Fund model represents investment in the first nominal project as a net 
negative cash flow of a single project for the government.  Subsequently this project 
generates the equivalent of .13 projects each year in energy savings.  These savings are 
sent back to the ESPC Fund, represented by a positive cash flow.  The Fund, in year two, 
invests in another typical project but uses the positive cash flow from the year one 
project’s savings to offset the cost of the investment:  1 new project required - .13 savings 
from previous project = .87 net new funding required for another nominal project 
investment.   
Assuming that the second project generates another savings of .13 projects, the 
Fund will have .26 equivalent projects to reinvest in year three’s nominal project,  
resulting in a -.74 net cash flow.  As the cycle continues, eventually, the cash generated 
from the energy savings is enough to finance entire projects without additional 
investment.   
In year nine, the ESPC Fund becomes cash flow positive.  At this point, the Fund 
is collecting more in energy savings than is required to invest in another nominal project.  
Energy projects are self sufficient beyond the cash flow positive point.  Table 3 
represents the net nominal project cash flows for 17 projects (the same amount as the 

















0 1 -1 (6.35)$      
1 2 -0.887 (5.63)$      
2 3 -0.774 (4.91)$      
3 4 -0.661 (4.20)$      
4 5 -0.548 (3.48)$      
5 6 -0.435 (2.76)$      
6 7 -0.322 (2.04)$      
7 8 -0.209 (1.33)$      
8 9 -0.096 (0.61)$      
9 10 0.017 0.11$       
10 11 0.13 0.83$       
11 12 0.243 1.54$       
12 13 0.356 2.26$       
13 14 0.356 2.26$       
14 15 0.356 2.26$       
15 16 0.356 2.26$       
16 17 0.356 2.26$       
17 17 1.356 8.61$       
18 17 1.243 7.89$       
19 17 1.13 7.18$       
20 17 1.017 6.46$       
21 17 0.904 5.74$       
22 17 0.791 5.02$       
23 17 0.678 4.31$       
24 17 0.565 3.59$       
25 17 0.452 2.87$       
26 17 0.339 2.15$       
27 17 0.226 1.44$       
28 17 0.113 0.72$       
 The PV of this stream of cash flows is zero.  The discount rate is once again 4.5%.  
Since t
. ESPC Fund at Similar Commercial Rate 
be a lower cost alternative to 
private









0 1 -1 (6.35)$      
1 2 -0.887 (5.63)$      
2 3 -0.774 (4.91)$      
3 4 -0.661 (4.20)$      
4 5 -0.548 (3.48)$      
5 6 -0.435 (2.76)$      
6 7 -0.322 (2.04)$      
7 8 -0.209 (1.33)$      
8 9 -0.096 (0.61)$      
9 10 0.017 0.11$       
10 11 0.13 0.83$       
11 12 0.243 1.54$       
12 13 0.356 2.26$       
13 14 0.469 2.98$       
14 15 0.582 3.70$       
15 16 0.695 4.41$       
16 17 0.808 5.13$       
17 17 1.808 11.48$     
18 17 1.695 10.76$     
19 17 1.582 10.05$     
20 17 1.469 9.33$       
21 17 1.356 8.61$       
22 17 1.243 7.89$       
23 17 1.13 7.18$       
24 17 1.017 6.46$       
25 17 0.904 5.74$       
26 17 0.791 5.02$       
27 17 0.678 4.31$       
28 17 0.565 3.59$       
29 17 0.452 2.87$       
30 17 0.339 2.15$       
31 17 0.226 1.44$       
32 17 0.113 0.72$       
he cost of borrowing via Treasury Bills is the same as the discount rate, the PV is 
zero.  The zero PV represents the benefits of positive cash flows equals the up-front cost 
of internally financing the nominal projects. 
 
3
The ESPC Fund does not have to be structured to 
 financing.  It can also be structured to replace, at the same terms and rates, the 
loans currently being used in the ESPC program.  A second internal financing model was 
run with the same terms as the external nominal project (8% interest rate over 16 years).  
Table 4 represents the cash flows for this scenario. 
 
The PV of this strategy’s nominal project cash flow is 1.98.  Therefore, by us
Net Nominal Net Dollar 
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the terms currently utilized by external financing, the ESPC Fund realizes a sizeable 
benefit over the cost of the investments.  Just as in the previous scenario, starting in year 
nine, the repayments from the previous projects are combined to pay for an entirely new 
project, without the need for more investment.  The magnitude of the benefits would be 
enhanced further if the residual benefits were reinvested in either larger or more 
numerous projects.  The goal should be to have as much capital as possible invested in 
the infrastructure, producing more streams of income available for reinvestment. 
Initially, this strategy looks to violate the assumption that the Fund operates at a 
breakeven basis, only recovering costs.  While the higher rate does result in more money 
flowing into the fund, the increased influx allows for greater investment.  The Fund will 
still run at a breakeven basis by investing in more projects.  The DoD benefits from the 






A. IMPLEMENTATION OF ESPC FUND 
The DoD should internally finance its ESPC program with a revolving fund.  The 
cash flow models of nominal projects demonstrate the immense potential of internal 
financing.  The Fund will increase the amount of infrastructure investment at a lower cost 
without negative long-term cash flows.   
The DoD does not meet the definition of a borrower in need of capital from a 
financial institution.  According to Prather, banks and lending institutions are designed to 
pool capital together to lend to borrowers without the means to raise the money on their 
own.  The government already has the capital raising mechanism internally in place.  
Treasury Bills allow the government to raise capital at a much more advantageous rate 
because the government does not have to earn a profit on the money borrowed. 
Therefore, the federal government should not be using commercially available loans to 
fund the ESPC program. 
As the DoD’s infrastructure’s energy efficiency is increased with each successive 
investment, the fund will face diminishing returns.  In the absence of new technology, the 
available investments that meet the required returns will become scarce.  During this time 
frame, the fund will be able to return surpluses back to the Treasury.  Eventually, a 
successful implementation of the Fund will result in newer, more efficient equipment, 
lower energy bills, and repayment of the investment back to the Treasury, not a private 
lending institution and its shareholders. 
 
B. PARAMETERS OF THE ESPC FUND 
The ESPC Fund should follow the same parameters of other revolving funds.  The 
fund should be run for long-term breakeven, reinvesting all energy savings (less 
administrative costs).  At the full, breakeven level the government will realize the 
maximum return from the EPSP program investment. 
The Fund should set an interest rate closer to the commercially available rate 
rather than the minimum rate needed to off set the cost of borrowing and the 
administrative cost of running the Fund.  A higher interest rate, in this case, does not raise 
the cost to the government.  In reality, the higher rate actually makes more of the energy 
value unlocked by the project available for reinvestment into the energy infrastructure.   










































Internal Financing at 4.5%
Internal Financing at 8%
Nominal Projects
 
Figure 3.   Annual Cash Flow Comparison of Each Financing Alternative 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the long-term implications of financing the ESPC program.  
Under the current program, the net cash flows, at a constant level of investment, become 
more negative each year.  Additional capital can be borrowed to alleviate the negative 
effects, however, as seen in year 16 when the investments are eliminated, the impact of 
no further investment is tremendous.  Therefore, the current system establishes an 
incentive for financial managers to continually borrow capital. New investments can be 
made as long as there are viable projects, however without significant technological  
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advancements, returns on investment will diminish over time.  When the returns no 
longer justify the investment, the reality of the combined debt obligations will be 
overwhelming. 
The internal financing of energy projects would act in opposition to the current 
program.  The program begins with a negative cash flow.  Therefore, there is an incentive 
for financial managers to reinvest as much capital as possible to unlock the greatest 
value.  In the internal scenario, when there are few viable projects, the managers are not 
confronted with two unsatisfactory alternatives but rather they have the enviable option 
of not investing and realizing a tremendously higher net cash flow.  The Fund will not 
invest in more projects because it has to but rather it will be incentivized to limit 
investment when it is in the best interest of the government.  The recommended 
parameters of the internally financed ESPC will result in more energy wealth and a better 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The ESPC financing models do answer the proposed research questions. 
1. Primary Research Question  
Does internal financing of the ESPC program create energy wealth for the DoD? 
The internal financing mechanism demonstrates that energy wealth can be created 
within the DoD.  The ESPC Fund model is likely to result in a greater PV for the 
government than the current program.  The greater PV represents an end state where the 
government has been able to realize greater energy infrastructure investment.  This level 
of investment would have been nearly impossible to attain under normal appropriations 
or even the current ESPC program, thus creating wealth for the DoD. 
 
2. Secondary Questions 
What is the financial magnitude of using internally financed projects instead of 
the current private lending institutions?  
The magnitude of wealth creation was shown to be dependent upon two factors.  
First, the interest rate used to calculate the payback terms is critical in assessing the PV of 
the program.  The higher the interest rate resulted in the higher the returns to the ESPC 
Fund.  The higher rate led to more cash flowing back into the fund that increases the 
reserves available to be reinvested.  
The second important factor that determines the financial magnitude of the 
program is the reinvestment rate.  In the model, the ESPC Fund only invested in one 
project per year.  Eventually, the Fund would have an increasing cash balance.  Excess 
investment is needed to put as much money to work as possible, thus increasing the 
return for the government.  The model, therefore, is inherently conservative and the 
financial impact from reinvestment should be much greater. 
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Is there a logical investment cash flow using internal financing mechanisms for 
ESPC projects? 
 The analysis shows the cash flow, based on the Working Capital Funds already in 
place, is both logical and advantageous for the government.  In this format, the 
transactions required to fund a single project originate from a single source.  The energy 
savings are then redirected back to the ESPC Fund.  The consistency and predictability of 
the cash flows allow for the model to effectively predict future in-flows and out-flows.   
 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH TOPICS 
The financing of the ESPC program has many facets that lead to future research 
topics.  First, the practical application of the internal financing option could be explored.  
The implementation of the Fund must take into account administrative costs, interest rate 
fluctuations, ECM performance risk, and maintaining the incentive for ESCOs to deliver 
results at or above the desired performance level.  The magnitude of these costs could 
hinder the real-world implementation of this proposal. 
Measurement and Verification (M&V) is another aspect of the program that needs 
further research.  External financing requires M&V to be accomplished before payments 
are made to the financial institutions.  Will implementation of internal financing 
eliminate the need to spend money each year to verify performance?  Further research 
could provide the first clear evidence of the financial benefits of M&V. 
Finally, future research could look at the effects of bundling various ECMs 
together in the internal financing program.  Currently, projects with short payback 
periods are used in a bundle to subsidize the payback of projects that may have payback 
periods greater than the 25-year requirement. Should bundling be done at the installation 
level or by the ESPC Fund in the internally financing environment,?  The Fund may be 
able to bundle projects from various installations, under one contract, to obtain an 





The lesson learned from this analysis is that as the DoD moves toward a more 
efficient funding of the ESPC program it has two choices:  1.  Increase the use of private 
financing each year, spreading the cost over a long time period, delaying the inevitable 
annual negative cash flow, or 2.  Use the internal ESPC Fund to facilitate long-term 
investment in the energy infrastructure with a significant up-front cost.  Unfortunately, 
there is no free lunch.   
DoD’s energy infrastructure is not going to become more efficient and reliable 
over the period of one or two years but rather over decades.  Infrastructure requires 
constant investment.  Improving the overall performance is the result of adequate 
investment, year after year. However, energy infrastructure is not a high visibility 
funding target and as resources available to DOD shrink over the next few years, energy 
infrastructure needs are likely to be overlooked or underfunded in the annual 
appropriations process. The ESPC program augments the annual appropriations, allowing 
installations to implement a comprehensive, long-term energy plan. 
The ESPC program, as it is currently funded, endangers the long-term viability of 
installation energy plans.  At some point the net ESPC cash flows for the government, 
relative to full up-front appropriations, will become negative.  During these periods, 
caused by limited ESPC investment, DoD financial managers will be forced to find 
money to meet the debt obligations.  Where will this money come from?  It could come 
from additional appropriations, but the most likely source of funds will be the vulnerable 
programs the ESPC is supposed to support, infrastructure improvement programs.  
Therefore, the current funding methods of ESPCs jeopardize the very programs they are 
intended to support.  
Internally financing the ESPC program avoids the negative aspects of using 
external capital.  Furthermore, the positive future cash flows of the program will allow 
for future investments that pay for themselves, not at the expense of other programs.  
This strategy allows the ESPC program to succeed, with regular appropriations, at 
making the overall DoD footprint more efficient, not in spite of it.  The internally funded  
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ESPC program could be the key to providing DoD with a self-sustaining energy 
infrastructure improvement program where new projects are funded by the wealth 
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